Management Accounting Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2000 words

Management Accounting - Essay Example However, contrary to this, the visual arts platform of the society constantly remains under the financial pressures and vulnerability even in the sound economic conditions of the country. The proponents of the visual arts, on this vulnerable situation of the visual arts platform have been raising constant voices over the matter. One the of such voices claim that visual arts organisations in order to successfully meet the societal requirement and expectation of educational and entertainment development shall maintains the system that provides it sound financial strength. However, despite the consensus on the need of the sound financial muscles for the visual arts organisations, there have been contrary views on the system to be employed for achieving them. One dominant view on the matter is pertaining to Royce (2011) view who insists that visual arts organisations shall develop a system similar to the business organisations. According to Royce (2011), well defined systems or more appr opriate to state that conduct like a business is mandatory for the effective results generation from the visual arts organisation. In this perspective, Royce (2011) stated that ‘Sound business models are a necessary component in healthy visual arts ecology and essential for most publicly funded organisations’. Royce (2011), for its concern over the detrimental and vulnerable condition of the visuals arts organisation shall proposed that all such organisations shall also have system for achieving the profitability. Viewing in the context of the definition for the arts in general and among definitions developed for the purpose, Shaw (2000) defined arts and creative industry activities as one that can be determined on the basis of its sustainable impact. As already reported, this impact is spread not only the social aspects but at the same time wide economic impact is also identified in many studies (Landry et al, 1996); hence, it is important to understand the fact that a n organisation in order to fulfil such responsibilities requires strong system. Royce (2011) assessment report was based in reference to the Arts Council England and the Turning Point Network but reflects the overall industry requirement. Visual arts organisation’s financial vulnerability, according to the Royce (2011), is due to the three main factors. First, the culture of organisational conduct prevailing at the visual arts organisations’ is in clear contrast to the economic principle mainly in terms of productivity. This practice is despite the proven facts that visual arts have always played an important role in the economics of the country and society (Reeves, 2002). More importantly, this practices is also in contrast to the development early in the history where since 1980s all cultural activities have been seen in the main context of their contribution the economic development and restructuring as well as revival of the manufacturing industry (Reeves, 2002). S econd factor that is responsible for this vulnerability is the tradition of free entry offered to audience in the many of the

The Role and Growth of NATO Essay Example for Free

The Role and Growth of NATO Essay From Thucydides onward, moral philosophers, students of international politics, statesmen, and policy makers have been preoccupied and very often troubled by the role of morality in international politics. There has often been a tendency, in the discourse on political morality and the ethical conduct of statecraft, to alternatively exaggerate or deprecate the influence of morality in internationalpolitics, and hence succumb to either self-righteous moralism or cynicism and skepticism. The task of moral reasoning about international politics is neither a simple nor an easy one, and is made more difficult when moralism is confused with morality. Moralism involves the adoption of a single value or principle and applying it indiscriminately without due regard to circumstances, time, or space. Morality, on the other hand, is the endless search for what is right in the midst of sometimes competing, sometimes conflicting, and sometimes incompatible values and principles (Morgenthau 79). The normative form of political realism admonishes us to think morally, not moralistically, and not to confuse self-righteousness with morality. It reminds us that international politics are too complex to resemble a morality play, and that moral choices are never easy. Yet all is not well in Europe. The end of the Cold War and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union ended the high-intensity threat to the West. Invasion is now implausible. However, the lacuna created by the absence of any high-intensity threat has been filled by low-intensity threats, taking the principal form of chronic instability in the Balkans and the outbreak of ethnic conflict stemming from the breakup of Yugoslavia. Indeed, the various Balkan wars are indicative of the fact that â€Å"history† and a particularly nasty and virulent form of nationalism persist quite stubbornly in that corner of Europe. The horrors and atrocities perpetrated in those wars were shocking to people who believed in â€Å"Never Again† and that European civilization had evolved beyond such behavior. This, of course, ought to be a sobering reminder that peace and stability can never be taken for granted, that liberal values are not as triumphant as some would like to believe, and that Locke, Kant, and Smith might have to make room for Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes as we are forced to reengage with history. How exactly are we to reengage with history? In the midst of peace and plenty, we have had the luxury of debating and rethinking our conceptions of security. Traditional state-centric notions of security, which privilege sovereignty over the rights and dignity of the individual, are called increasingly into question. They are deemed relics of the past, fig leaves hiding the intellectual paucity of Cold Warriors unable or unwilling to adapt themselves to an altered security environment. We are witnessing the rise of a rival orthodoxy regarding how we think and act about security, one that is centered on human rights and human security—consonant with our posthistorical values and sensibilities—and allegedly better suited to deal with the problems of intrastate warfare and ethnic conflict. This rival orthodoxy, we are to believe, is morally superior and more evolved than traditional notions of security. After all, what sort of person can be against human rights and human security? On 24 March 1999, NATO began Operation Allied Force, an aerial bombing campaign that was to last seventy-eight days. The Atlantic Alliance, arguably the most powerful and successful politico-military coalition in history, created originally to defend Western Europe against a Soviet onslaught, now went to war for human security. In the subsequent military campaign, NATO won and got what it wanted, and then some. The Alliance triumphed without a single combat casualty. Serbian military and paramilitary forces, looking remarkably unscathed despite the scope and intensity of NATO sorties, evacuated the province. A NATO-led military force moved in, and Kosovar refugees started returning home. Kosovo is now a de facto protectorate of NATO and the United Nations, even if the fiction that the province remains a sovereign and integral part of Yugoslavia is maintained. Kosovars are champing at the bit to cleanse the province ethnically of the remaining Serbian minority, even as we insist that our goal is to reconstitute a multiethnic and multicultural Kosovo. Slobodan Milosevic is gone but the genie of ethnic strife is already out of the bottle, and the Balkans remain as unstable as ever (An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State March 2002). A question mark hangs over an â€Å"ethic of responsibility,† meanwhile, because the jury is still out as to whether we will be able to move toward such an ethic when it comes to future humanitarian interventions or whether â€Å"humanitarian warfare† is, as some argue, â€Å"an idea whose time has come, and gone† (Krauthammer 8). From the Balkans to the Caucasus, the environment remains ripe for massive and violent abuses of human rights—thus opportunities to intervene—even if NATO does not expand any further to the East. The temptation to intervene will be great. If CNN is present, we will have emotional and gut-wrenching scenes of human suffering beamed into our living rooms and there will be a clamor to â€Å"do something† (Hudson and Stanier 256).   And why not do something? The Alliance has already bent, if not broken international law over Kosovo. Surely it will be easier the second time around. Furthermore, NATO now possesses a template for â€Å"immaculate intervention.† The Alliance will not deploy ground troops but can instead rely on precision guided munitions dropped from on high, with little or no risk to its servicemen and women (Burk 53–78). Humanitarian intervention is characterized by motive and ends, the motive to do good, and the goal to put an end to human suffering. This is what is supposed to distinguish â€Å"moral† interventions from â€Å"immoral† ones (Abrams 74). It was said of the Gulf War that the West would not have come to the aid of Kuwait if that country had produced broccoli instead of oil. Kosovo possessed neither oil nor broccoli. Hence, we were told by President Bill Clinton that NATO’s actions were intended to â€Å"enable the Kosovar people to return to their homes with safety and self-government,† or alternatively to â€Å"protect thousands of innocent people in Kosovo from a mounting military offensive.† (Roberts 20) The Alliance’s objectives were thus to avert a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo and/or to prevent a crisis from becoming a catastrophe. Kosovo was to be a new sort of war, one fought in the name of universal values and principles—to uphold human rights and prevent a humanitarian tragedy—rather than for narrow interests (Roberts 20). Yet motives and ends are dangerously unreliable as criteria for moral calculation and judgment. Moral judgment cannot be suspended simply because the motives are pure, the cause just, and the ends good. The decision to enlarge the Atlantic Alliance has opened debate as to whether an expanded alliance will help to sustain global peace or provoke greater tension, if not regional or global wars. International relations theorists are largely divided over the question, and the relationship between alliance enlargement and the question of war or peace is unclear and ambiguous. Alliances in general have often been blamed as one of the major factors helping to generate the fears and suspicions leading to World War I, as well as previous wars in European history, at least since the advent of the formal multipolar â€Å"balance of power† system in the mid-seventeenth century. American foreign policy from George Washington to World War II traditionally eschewed â€Å"entangling alliances.† On the other hand, the lack of strong alliances and of firm American commitments to Britain, France, and to key strategically positioned states such as Poland, for example, has been cited as one of the causes of World War II. Following Soviet retrenchment from eastern Europe after 1989, and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet state in 1991, the Atlantic Alliance has been praised as the most successful alliance in history. Without NATO, it is argued, the peace of Europe could not have been secured throughout the Cold War. Detractors, however, have argued that NATO’s formation in 1949 led to the counterformation of the 1950 Sino-Soviet alliance—and indirectly to the Korean War—in addition to the establishment of the Warsaw Pact following West Germany’s admission to NATO in 1955. These contrasting perspectives do not clarify the relationship between alliances and war in today’s geostrategic circumstances. The question remains as to whether German unification, followed by Soviet implosion, and now by NATO enlargement into east-central Europe, will prove stabilizing. The Alliance has opted to extend its membership to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary within the former Soviet sphere of influence, raising some fears of a new partition of Europe. At the same time, NATO has promised to consider further enlarging its membership; it has advocated what has been deemed an â€Å"open NATO†Ã¢â‚¬â€in part to prevent a possible new partition between members and nonmembers. Alliance pronouncements promised that Romania and Slovenia would be granted first consideration in a second round, in addition to one or more of the Baltic states. Indeed, NATO has not left out the possibility of Russian membership, but has only taken limited steps in this direction (Kegley and Raymond 275–277). Despite the fact that NATO is one of the most institutionalized alliances ever created, with decades of experience in fostering close ties among its members, the United States chose not to use NATO to organize its response to the attacks. NATO was unable to provide a command structure—or even substantial capabilities—that would override U.S. concerns about using the NATO machinery. European contributions were incorporated on a bilateral basis, but NATO as an organization remained limited to conducting patrols over the United States and deploying ships to the eastern Mediterranean. This U.S. policy choice did not surprise many in the United States. Many U.S. policymakers believed that NATOs war in Kosovo was an unacceptable example of â€Å"war by committee,† where political interference from the alliances 19 members prevented a quick and decisive campaign. The policymakers were determined to retain sole command authority in Afghanistan, so that experience would not be repeated (Daalder and Gordon). The deployment of the NATO AWACS demonstrates this point. The United States did not want to deploy the NATO AWACS directly to Afghanistan, because it did not want to involve the North Atlantic Council in any command decisions. Instead, the NATO AWACS backfilled U.S. assets so the assets could redeploy to Afghanistan. A military official later described the U.S. decision in these terms: â€Å"If you were the US, would you want 18 other nations watering down your military planning?† (Fiorenza 22) However, many Europeans were dissatisfied with the small role that the alliance played in the response to the September 11 attacks and attributed it to U.S. unilateralism and arrogance. While they understood the need to ensure effective command and control, they felt that they had given the United States unconditional political support through the invocation of Article 5 and that they should at least be consulted about the direction of the military campaign. In part, these frustrations resulted from the fact that the military campaign did not fit the model all had come to expect during the Cold War— that an invocation of Article 5 would lead the alliance members to join together and defeat a common enemy (Kitfield). But these frustrations also reflected a fear that the U.S. decision to pursue the war on its own after invoking Article 5 would irrevocably weaken the core alliance principle of collective defense. To uncover a possible answer to the question as to whether an extended NATO alliance will prove stabilizing, I seek to explicate the views of international relations theorist, George Liska. Even though he was well known in the 1960s for his classic definition of alliances, Liska’s later comparative geohistorical perspective of the 1970s and 1980s has often been overlooked or not fully appreciated (Kegley). Although generally pessimistic, Liska argues that major power or systemic war is not inevitable and can be averted, yet only given a long-term strategy of cooptation of potential rivals into the interstate system. For Liska, alliances are neither inherently stabilizing or destabilizing. Like armaments, they do not in themselves cause war, but they can set the preconditions for generalized conflict depending on the manner and circumstances in which they are formed and depending on which specific states are included. Moreover, the expansion of an alliance formation is less likely to provoke major power war when the predominant states of a particular historical period are either overtly or tacitly included. Generalized wars, however, are more likely to occur when the predominant powers cannot participate in the key decision-making processes that affect their perceived vital interests, and thus cannot formulate truly concerted policies. Global conflict has largely stemmed from the apparently recurrent failures of the major contending states to forge long-term entente, or full-fledged alliance, relationships. Since 1991 the world has seen a new opportunities, but the weight of the millennial past continues to burden the present (Liska 17). Although the U.S.-Soviet wartime alliance against Germany, 1941–1945, collapsed after World War II, the superpowers were by contrast able to maintain a general state of peace, though not without intense regional conflicts often fought through surrogates. The ensuing struggle for control of former German spheres of influence, the quarantine of East Germany and other Soviet-bloc states, the formation of NATO, Soviet/Russian fears of a U.S./NATO alliance with the flanking states of Japan and the People’s Republic of China, collectively resemble the 477 to 461 B.C. phase of Athenian-Spartan relations, following the breakdown of their alignment against Persia. Throughout the Cold War, Washington and Moscow sustained a tacit multidimensional â€Å"double containment† of Germany and Japan, as well as other significant regional powers, including China, that helped to prevent open conflict between them. Yet it is precisely the Soviet/Russian role in this multidimensional double containment that has virtually disappeared following German unification (Gardner 7-9). The collapse of the Soviet Empire and its spheres of security parallel the instability that confronted Sparta. Continuing fears of national uprisings and Russian disaggregation, coupled with recurrent wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan, recall the threats posed by the Helot revolution and the Third Messenian War. The United States and NATO now bid for control over former Soviet and Russian spheres of influence in Central and Eastern Europe much as Athens penetrated Sparta’s sphere in the Aegean and then the Ionian seas. Disputes over power and burden sharing within NATO, considered together with differences over the financing of the 1990 Persian Gulf war and the conduct wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, are reminiscent of Athenian efforts to sustain preeminence over its Delian league allies, regardless of the diminished Persian threat. Moreover, Pericles’ decision to forge a new â€Å"defensive† alliance with the insular power bears similarities to NATO’s decision to extend its alliance with Western Europe into Central Europe, a change depicted as defensive, involving no nuclear weapons or additional troops to be deployed on the territory of new NATO members (Gardner 20–26). Most crucially, should the United States and Russia not be able to reach a compromise over the question of the modalities of NATO enlargement into East-Central Europe, the two powers risk losing their tacit post-World War II alliance against Germany and Japan altogether. This would parallel the Athenian decision to drop entirely its deteriorating ties with Sparta after the new Athenian democratic leadership expelled Cimon. Moreover, American proposals to build a ballistic missile defense in possible violation of the ABM treaty could be interpreted by Russia in much the same way that Sparta interpreted the Athenian decision to build defensive walls around the city of Athens. In a word, the United States is presently poised either to renew its relations with Moscow or else let them sour to an even greater extent, thus risking another round of mutual imprecations that could degenerate into a wider conflict. Turning to another episode involving an essentially bipolar land/sea schism, namely the clash between Rome and Carthage over spheres of influence in Spain, Sicily, and the Mediterranean, raises additional questions about Soviet collapse and NATO enlargement. Much as the Peloponnesian wars can be viewed as a result of the breakdown of the Athenian-Spartan wartime alliance, the First Punic War can likewise be interpreted as a product of the termination of the 279–278 B.C. Roman-Carthaginian wartime alliance against Tarentum and Pyrrhus of Epirus. The alliance between Rome and Carthage followed the classic â€Å"Pyrrhic victory† at Ausculum that opened Sicily up to Greek conquest. The deterioration of that alliance was provoked by the Roman decision to assist the Mamertines against Syracuse in 264 B.C. and to take Messana under Roman protection. This unexpected action led Carthage to support Syracuse in response. This in turn represented a reversal in alliances equally unanticipated by Rome, as Carthage and Syracuse had traditionally been enemies (Harris 187). Carthage subsequently accused Rome of a violation of its previous agreements, which, according to Carthaginian sources, forbade the Romans to cross into Sicily and the Carthaginians to cross into Roman spheres. In fact, Rome and Carthage did sign three treaties in 510–509, 348, and 306 B.C., designed to sustain Carthagian spheres of influence over Western Sicily, Sardinia, Libya, and the Iberian peninsula, but there was no agreement addressing specifically the changing status of a divided Sicily. The 510–509 B.C. treaty, signed in the year that marks the formation of the Roman Republic, sought to affirm Roman agreement to abide by the historically positive relations between Carthage and Etrusca. In the 306 B.C. treaty, Rome vowed not to cross the Straits of Messina in exchange for a Carthagian concession to permit Rome full liberty of maneuver in the Italian peninsula. Moreover, even if there was no formal treaty in 279–278 B.C., there may have been a tacit understanding involving a vague mutual recognition of respective military and commercial spheres of influence that was at least proposed during the 279–278 B.C. wartime alliance against Pyrrhus (Eckstein 79). Whether a formal treaty actually existed is really secondary to the point that Carthage at least operated under the assumption that some type of accord existed in order to justify its previous alliance relationship, and it jealously guarded Western Sicily as the central strategic keystone to its insular defense. On the other hand, Roman expansion to Calabria diminished the size of the buffer region between the two states. As an expanding continental power seeking amphibious status, Rome began to regard the Carthagian presence on Sicily as a potential â€Å"encirclement.† Carthage was regarded as threatening Rome’s maritime trade from ports on the Ionian Sea and in the Gulf of Tarante. The charge that a tacit agreement was violated is not unlike the debate between the United States and Russia, as to whether Washington affirmed absolutely in 1989–1990 that it would not extend NATO into East-Central Europe. Moscow has argued that the decision to enlarge NATO into what it has considered its central strategic region of continental defense contravenes the spirit of the â€Å"two plus four† treaty on German unification not to permit NATO forces into the territory of the former East Germany, as well as the â€Å"gentleman’s agreement† made between George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1990 against NATO expansion. As a rising land power seeking amphibious status, Rome expanded into Calabria and thereby diminished the historic buffer between Etrucsa/Rome and Carthage, a power in relative decline. In contemporary geopolitics, NATO enlargement into former Soviet and historic Russian spheres of influence similarly risks undermining the post-1945 security buffer between the United States and its German ally and a Russia now in a state of near absolute collapse. Works Cited Abrams, Elliott. â€Å"To Fight the Good Fight.† National Interest 59 (spring 2000): 74. Burk, James. â€Å"Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the Casualties Hypothesis.† Political Science Quarterly 114, no. 1 (2003): 53–78. Eckstein, Arthur M. â€Å"Senate and General.† Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987, p. 79. Fiorenza, Nicholas. â€Å"Alliance Solidarity,† Armed Forces Journal International, December 2004, p. 22. Daalder, Ivo H. and Gordon, Philip R. â€Å"Euro-Trashing,† Washington Post, May 29, 2002. Retrieved July 9, 2007 from http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-361506.html. Gardner, Hall. â€Å"Central and Southeastern Europe in Transition.†Ã‚   Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005. Harris, William V. â€Å"War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327–70 BC.† Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979, p. 187. Hudson, Miles and Stanier, John. â€Å"War and the Media: A Random Searchlight.† New York: New York University Press, 2003, p. 256. Kegley, Charles W. Jr. and Raymond, Gregory A. â€Å"Alliances and the Preservation of the Postwar Peace: Weighing the Contribution† in The Long Postwar Peace, ed. Charles W.Kegley Jr. (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), pp. 275–277. Kitfield, James. â€Å"Divided We Fall.† National Journal. April 7, 2006 Retrieved July 7, 2007 from nationaljournal.com/about/njweekly/stories/2006/0407nj1.htm Krauthammer, Charles. â€Å"The Short, Unhappy Life of Humanitarian Warfare.† National Interest 57 (fall 2004): 8. Liska, George. â€Å"Russia and the Road to Appeasement.† Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1982. Morgenthau, Hans J. â€Å"The Twilight of International Morality,† Ethics 58, no. 2 (1948): 79. â€Å"NATO In The 21ST Century — The Road Ahead†. An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State March 2002. Retrieved July 7, 2007 from www.italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/ej/ijpe0302.pdf Roberts, Adam. â€Å"NATO’s ‘Humanitarian War’ Over Kosovo,† Survival 41, no. 3 (2004): 20.

Hip-hop, Reggae, and Politics Essay -- Essays on Politics

Hip-hop, Reggae, and Politics Introduction Music is an art form and source of power. Many forms of music reflect culture and society, as well as, containing political content and social message. Music as social change has been highlighted throughout the 20th century. In the 1960s the United States saw political and socially oriented folk music discussing the Vietnam War and other social issues. In Jamaica during the 1970s and 1980s reggae developed out of the Ghetto’s of Trench town and expressed the social unrest of the poor and the need to over-through the oppressors. The 1980’s brought the newest development in social and political music, the emergence of hip-hop and rap. This urban musical art form that was developed in New York City has now taken over the mainstream, but originated as an empowering art form for urban youth and emerging working class. Musically hip-hop spawned the age of DJ’s. With strong influences from Reggae, hip-hop has developed into an empowering form for the expression of ideas, power, revolution and change. Power and empowerment have emerged from these musical styles that now have many commonalities. Hip-hop and Reggae are both forms of protest music. â€Å"Protest music is characterized by objections to injustices and oppressions inflicted on certain individual groups†¦. typically, the intent of protest musicians is to oppose the exploitation and oppression exercised by dominant elites and member of dominant groups†(Stapleton, 221). Hip-hop has developed as a new form of protest music void of the common acoustic guitar. The goal of protest music is to promote freedom through music. Bob Marley expresses his belief that music is a message and route to freedom in the song â€Å"Trench town.† ... ...ap† Miami New Times, February 10, 2000, Thursday. Salmon, Barrington â€Å" Bob Marley’s legacy lives forever† Miami Times, V. 73; N. 22 p. 5A, 2/18/1996 Shivers, Kaia â€Å"This is Reggae Music† Los Angeles Sentinel† V. 66; N. 32 p. B5 11/8/2000 Wilson, Basil â€Å"The politics & culture of Reggae music† The Caribbean-American Magazine v. 24 N. 1 p. 25, 2/28/2000 Discography: Honorary Citizen: Peter Tosh, Sony Music Entertainment:1997 Steffens, Roger. â€Å"In the Tracks of the Stepping Razor: The Peter Tosh Biography† pgs. 42-51 Reflection Eternal: Talib Kweli, Rawkus Records 2000 â€Å"This means you† Run DMC: Run DMC, Arista Records 1983 â€Å"Its Like That† Bob Marley: Confrontation, Polygram Records 1983 â€Å"Chant down Babylon,† and â€Å"Trenchtown† Bob Marley: Suvival, Ploygram Records 1979 â€Å"Babylon System†

Balanced Scorecard Study – Samsung

Kashun Davis TMAN 680 Fall 2012 Balanced Scorecard: Samsung Samsung is the technology-based organization that will be the subject for my Balanced Scorecard. Founded in 1938 in Seoul, South Korea, Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. engages in the manufacture, distribution, and sale of finished electronic products and device solutions worldwide. They offer consumer products, including mobile phones, tablets, televisions, Blu-rays, DVD players, home theaters, multimedia players; home appliances, such as refrigerators, washing machines, air conditioners, etc; Laptops and personal computers.The company also designs and manufactures integrated circuits for digital information storage in consumer electronics. It has operations in Korea, U. S. , Europe, Asia, Africa, Africa and China. Because of the large size of the Samsung Corporation, I will focus on Samsung smartphones, one of their technology-intensive business units. The vision of Samsung: â€Å"Samsung is dedicated to developing innovative technologies and efficient processes that create new markets, enrich people's lives, and continue to make Samsung a digital leader. Their mission statement, â€Å"At Samsung, we follow a simple business philosophy: to devote our talent and technology to creating superior products and services that contribute to a better global society. Samsung’s net sales have risen from 158. 9 billion in 2007 to 220. 1 billion in 2011. Their total assets grew from 280. 8 billion in 2007 to 343. 7 billion in 2011. Unfortunately their total liabilities went from 181. 7 billion in 2007 to 202. 6 billion in 2011. Stockholder’s equity almost doubled from 80. billion in 2007 to 141. 1 billion in 2011. Samsung’s net income also increased from 12. 9 billion in 2007 to 21. 2 billion in 2011. It’s also not strange to see their employee base increase due to their explosive growth over this five-year time span. They had 254,000 employees in 2007 and now have over 344,000 employees in 2011 (â€Å"About Samsung,† 2010). Their electronics division has 190,500 employees at the end of 2011. With respect to the Smartphone business unit out of the 1. billion mobile phones sold worldwide in 2011, Samsung accounted for 330 million of those units. Their Galaxy S II sold more than 20 million units since its launch in 2011. In 2012, Samsung launched the Galaxy S III and expects to strengthen their brand and increase market share in the mobile phone arena (â€Å"About Samsung,† 2010). The balanced scorecard is defined as a management system that maps an organization’s strategic objectives into performance metrics in four perspectives: financial, internal processes, customers, and learning and growth (NetMBA, 2002).The four perspectives mentioned above construct the balanced scorecard framework. To create a balanced scorecard for Samsung’s Smartphone business division this framework has to be applied. First, I will assess the mission, vision, c hallenges, and partners of the company. The vision of Samsung: â€Å"Samsung is dedicated to developing innovative technologies and efficient processes that create new markets, enrich people's lives, and continue to make Samsung a digital leader. Their mission statement, â€Å"At Samsung, we follow a simple business philosophy: to devote our talent and technology to creating superior products and services that contribute to a better global society. Samsung not only makes smartphones, but they also create components like displays and integrated circuits that also go into competitor’s smartphones, such as Apple’s iPhone. Samsung’s competitors in the mobile phone market are Apple, Microsoft, Google, HTC, Nokia, and Blackberry. Samsung doesn’t make their own proprietary software and hardware as Apple, Google, and Blackberry.Samsung exclusively uses Google’s Android Mobile OS for their phones. Another challenge Samsung faces, is that their mobile phon es are not only in competition with other phones that have different software platforms, but they are in even stiffer competition with other phones that also use Google’s Android Mobile OS. This market in itself is very fragmented from the fact that more than 4,000 distinct smartphone models exist that uses the Android operating system (Valazco, 2012). Fortunately for Samsung they command 25. % of the smartphone manufacture market putting them on top. LG, Apple, Motorola, and HTC own 18. 4%, 16. 3%, 11. 2%, and 6. 4% of the smartphone manufacture market respectively (â€Å"comscore reports July,† 2012). With respect to the balanced scorecard framework, a strategy map will assist with connecting the four perspectives and how they relate to each other. The strategic measures chosen for the Learning & Growth Perspective were chosen based on information listed in the Samsung’s annual report. Samsung’s employees have grown over the past few years. Samsung†™s social etwork presence is currently greater than their competitors, but there is always room for improvement. Samsung invested $8B USD in R&D, which this funnels down to organizational capital and learning from their competitors. With respect to the Internal Process Perspective $8B USD were invested into R&D for innovation. Customer Satisfaction is never perfect in any organization, thus leaving room for improvement. Not to mention customer satisfaction can translate into sales. Management of operations was chosen because process improvement is always needed in an organization.The customer perspective measurements are strengthening the brand, gaining OEM market share, and exceeding customer expectations. All of these links to financial success within the organization, thus focusing on these measures is vital to the growth Samsung expects to see in the future. Stockholder equity, net sales, and net income all affect the customer, internal, and learning & growth perspective measu res and vice versa. This provides a top to bottom and bottom to top flow balanced measures. Learning & Growth Perspective| Objective| Measure| Target| Initiative|Grow Human Capital| # Of Employees in Samsung Electronics Division| 200,000 employees| Aggressive Recruitment and Retention Program| Improve Information Capital| Social Networking Effectiveness| 6 Million Twitter Followers; 40 Million Facebook Likes| Aggressive & Interactive Social Networking Campaign| Build Organizational Capital| Submittal of Employee Ideas| 5,000 Employee Ideas Submitted| Conduct Organizational Learning Study of Samsung Mobile Division (Amiri, 2010)| Learn from our Competitors| Mobile OEM Market Share| Increase Mobile OEM Market Share by 20%| Analyze competitors customer base and meet the needs of that customer base through innovative mobile technology | Internal Process Perspective| Objective| Measure| Target| Initiative| Manage Innovations| Successful Research & Development Projects| Double R&D Project s| Allocate more capital to R&D projects and their implementation| Manage Customer Relations| Customer Satisfaction| Double and Sustain Customer Satisfaction scores| Aggressive ustomer service training for employees| Manage Operations| Value Added & Non-Value Added Operations| Increase Value Added Operations and Reduce/eliminate non-value added operations| Lean Six-Sigma Process Improvement Initiative (Qun, 2012)| Customer Perspective| Objective| Measure| Target| Initiative| Strengthen Samsung Smartphone Brand| Market Share| Increase Market Share| Aggressive Marketing Campaign| Gain Smartphone OEM Market Share| OEM Market Share| Increase Mobile OEM Market Share by 20%| Analyze competitors customer base and meet the needs of that customer base through innovative mobile technology| Exceeding customer needs and expectations| Customer Satisfaction Scores | Customer Retention| Double Customer satisfaction scores & retention | Customer Loyalty & Rewards Program | Customer Perspective| Obj ective| Measure| Target| Initiative|Increase Stockholder Equity| Stock Price| Increase from $489/share to $510/share| Increase Market Share| Increase Net Sales| Net Sales| Increase from 135B to 170B| Aggressive Marketing Campaign| Increase Net Income| Net Income| Increase by 15%| Make Operations Efficient and reducing costs| Sources About Samsung. (2010). Retrieved from http://www. samsung. com/us/aboutsamsung/corporateprofile/ourperformance/samsungprofile. html Amiri, A. , Jandghi, G. , Alvani, S. , Hosnavi, R. , & Ramezan, M. (2010). Increasing the Intellectual Capital in Organization: Examining the Role of Organizational Learning. European Journal Of Social Science,  14(1/2), 98-108. comscore reports July 2012 U. S. mobile subscriber market share. (2012, Sept 04). Retrieved from http://www. comscore. com/Insights/Press_Releases/2012/9/comScore_Reports_July_2012_US_Mobile_Subscriber_Market_Share NetMBA. (2002). Netmba business knowledge center.Retrieved from http://www. netmba. com/accounting/mgmt/balanced-scorecard/ Samsung Group. (2011). Samsung profile 2011. Retrieved from http://www. samsung. com/us/aboutsamsung/corporateprofile/download/Samsung_Profile_2011-EN-final-revise. pdf Qun, Z. , Irfan, M. , Khattak, M. , Abbas, J. , Xiaoning, Z. , & Shah, M. (2012). CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS FOR SUCCESSFUL LEAN SIX SIGMA IMPLEMENTATION IN PAKISTAN. Interdisciplinary Journal Of Contemporary Research In Business,  4(1), 117-124. Valazco, C. (2012, May 15). Techcrunch. Retrieved from http://techcrunch. com/2012/05/15/3997-models-android-fragmentation-as-seen-by-the-developers-of-opensignalmaps/

Bradbury’s the Sound of Thunder and Skurzynski’s Nethergrave

English Critical Essay Bradbury’s  The Sound of Thunder  and Skurzynski’s  Nethergrave  are both intriguing science fiction stories. Both stories are about technology changing the life of an individual. In the the story Nethergrave, a boy name Jeremy chooses a virtual world over the real world where he feels embarrassed, uncomfortable, and alone. In the story A Sound of Thunder, the main character, Eckels, faces severe consequences due to a mistake that he makes when going back in time. Nevertheless, both characters’ personality is pretty similar in some ways both being somewhat cowardly.Both are about the effect technology can have on the world. I honestly felt that Bradbury’s story was more interesting than Skurzynski’s story. I found that the slightest thing in the past may change the future massively. In the story, Eckels uses a new invention, a time machine. Then he decided to go back to the time when dinosaurs were alive. While he was there, that triggered terrible consequences. Eckels’ death in the end wasn’t very surprising. The mistake seemed very small at the time, but had a massive effect on the outcome of the present-day world.Although Skurzynski’s story was very relatable towards others, I still think Bradbury’s story was better. Nethergrave  was about a boy named Jeremy, making a decision of staying in a world he wasn’t happy in or to leave and enter a whole new world in which he was promised never to be alone or hurt. The idea of a boy feeling awkward in the real world, then looking into what appears to be a better world just isn’t what I find interesting. I have sometimes felt awkward and embarrassed in this world, though I do not think that I would want to enter a virtual world.Throughout the story, I never felt as though I liked or related to Jeremy’s character. Both of the stories show how technology can change a person’s life for better or fo r worse. Technology can be very useful but it can also cause destruction. In science fiction plots, often results in a negative effect. Technology can be both destructive and useful, but in these stories, they both have negative outcomes. As in Skurzynski’s story, Jeremy was introduced to a new virtual world, which resulted in Jeremy ending his life on earth. In Bradbury’s story, the time machine ended up changing the present world.

The Battle of Peleliu in World War II

The Battle of Peleliu in World War II The Battle of Peleliu was fought September 15 to November 27, 1944, during World War II (1939-1945). Part of the Allies island-hopping strategy, it was believed that Peleliu needed to be captured before operations could commence against either the Philippines or Formosa. While planners had originally believed that the operation would only require a few days, it ultimately took over two months to secure the island as its nearly 11,000 defenders retreated into a system of interconnected bunkers, strong points, and caves. The garrison exacted a heavy price on the attackers and the Allied effort quickly became a bloody, grinding affair. On November 27, 1944, after weeks of bitter fighting, Peleliu was declared secure. Background Having advanced across the Pacific after victories at Tarawa, Kwajalein, Saipan, Guam, and Tinian, Allied leaders reached a crossroads regarding future strategy. While General Douglas MacArthur favored advancing into the Philippines to make good his promise to liberate that country, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz preferred to capture Formosa and Okinawa, which could serve springboards for future operations against China and Japan. Flying to Pearl Harbor, President Franklin Roosevelt met with both commanders before ultimately electing to follow MacArthurs recommendations. As part of the advance to the Philippines, it was believed that Peleliu in the Palau Islands needed to be captured to secure the Allies right flank (Map). Fast Facts: Battle of Peleliu Conflict: World War II (1939-1945)Dates: September 15 to November 27, 1944Armies Commanders:AlliesMajor General William RupertusRear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf1st Marine Division (17,490 men), 81st Infantry Division (10,994 men)Japanese:Colonel Kunio Nakagawaapprox. 11,000 menCasualties:Allies: 2,336 killed and 8,450 wounded/missingJapanese: 10,695 killed and 202 captured The Allied Plan Responsibility for the invasion was given to Major General Roy S. Geigers III Amphibious Corps and Major General William Rupertuss 1st Marine Division was assigned to make the initial landings. Supported by naval gunfire from Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorfs ships offshore, the Marines were to assault beaches on the southwest side of the island. Going ashore, the plan called for the 1st Marine Regiment to land to the north, the 5th Marine Regiment in the center, and the 7th Marine Regiment in the south. Hitting the beach, the 1st and 7th Marines would cover the flanks as the 5th Marines drove inland to capture Pelelius airfield. This done, the 1st Marines, led by Colonel Lewis Chesty Puller were to turn north and attack the islands highest point, Umurbrogol Mountain. In assessing the operation, Rupertus expected to secure the island in a matter of days. Colonel Lewis Chesty Puller, 1950. US Marine Corps A New Plan The defense of Peleliu was overseen by Colonel Kunio Nakagawa. Following a string of defeats, the Japanese began to reassess their approach to island defense. Rather than attempting to halt Allied landings on the beaches, they devised a new strategy which called for islands to be heavily fortified with strong points and bunkers. These were to be connected by caves and tunnels which would allow troops to be safely shifted with ease to meet each new threat. To support this system, troops would make limited counterattacks rather than the reckless banzai charges of the past. While efforts would be made to disrupt enemy landings, this new approach sought to bleed the Allies white once they were ashore. The key to Nakagawas defenses were over 500 caves in the Umurbrogol Mountain complex. Many of these were further fortified with steel doors and gun emplacements. At the north of the Allies intended invasion beach, the Japanese tunneled through a 30-foot high coral ridge and installed a variety of guns and bunkers. Known as The Point, the Allies had no knowledge of the ridges existence as it did not show on existing maps. In addition, the islands beaches were heavily mined and strewn with a variety of obstacles to hamper potential invaders. Unaware of the change in Japanese defensive tactics, Allied planning moved forward as normal and the invasion of Peleliu was dubbed Operation Stalemate II. A Chance to Reconsider To aid in operation, Admiral William Bull Halseys carriers commenced a series of raids in the Palaus and Philippines. These met little Japanese resistance led him to contact Nimitz on September 13, 1944, with several suggestions. First, he recommended that the attack on Peleliu be abandoned as unneeded and that the assigned troops be given to MacArthur for operations in the Philippines. He also stated that the invasion of the Philippines should begin immediately. While leaders in Washington, DC agreed to move up the landings in the Philippines, they elected to push forward with the Peleliu operation as Oldendorf had begun the pre-invasion bombardment on September 12 and troops were already arriving in the area. Going Ashore As Oldendorfs five battleships, four heavy cruisers, and four light cruisers pounded Peleliu, carrier aircraft also struck targets across the island. Expending a massive amount of ordnance, it was believed that the garrison was completely neutralized. This was far from the case as the new Japanese defense system survived nearly untouched. At 8:32 AM on September 15, the 1st Marine Division began their landings. The first wave of LVTs moves toward the invasion beaches, passing through the inshore bombardment line of LCI gunboats. Cruisers and battleships are bombarding from the distance. The landing area is almost totally hidden in dust and smoke. US Naval History and Heritage Command Coming under heavy fire from batteries at either end of the beach, the division lost many LVTs (Landing Vehicle Tracked) and DUKWs forcing large numbers of Marines to wade ashore. Pushing inland, only the 5th Marines made any substantial progress. Reaching the edge of the airfield, they succeeded in turning back a Japanese counterattack consisting of tanks and infantry (Map). A Bitter Grind The next day, the 5th Marines, enduring heavy artillery fire, charged across the airfield and secured it. Pressing on, they reached the eastern side of the island, cutting off the Japanese defenders to the south. Over the next several days, these troops were reduced by the 7th Marines. Near the beach, Pullers 1st Marines began attacks against The Point. In bitter fighting, Pullers men, led by Captain George Hunts company, succeeded in reducing the position. Despite this success, the 1st Marines endured nearly two days of counterattacks from Nakagawas men. Moving inland, the 1st Marines turned north and began engaging the Japanese in the hills around Umurbrogol. Sustaining serious losses, the Marines made slow progress through the maze of valleys and soon named the area Bloody Nose Ridge. As the Marines ground their way through the ridges, they were forced to endure nightly infiltration attacks by the Japanese. Having sustained 1,749 casualties, approximately 60% of the regiment, in several days fighting, the 1st Marines were withdrawn by Geiger and replaced with the 321st Regimental Combat Team from the US Armys 81st Infantry Division. The 321st RCT landed north of the mountain on September 23 and began operations. A U.S. Marine Corps Chance Vought F4U-1 Corsair aircraft attacks a Japanese bunker at the Umurbrogol mountain on Peleliu with napalm bombs. US Marine Corps Supported by the 5th and 7th Marines, they had a similar experience to Pullers men. On September 28, the 5th Marines took part in a short operation to capture Ngesebus Island, just north of Peleliu. Going ashore, they secured the island after a brief fight. Over the next few weeks, Allied troops continued to slowly battle their way through Umurbrogol. With the 5th and 7th Marines badly battered, Geiger withdrew them and replaced them with the 323rd RCT on October 15. With the 1st Marine Division fully removed from Peleliu, it was sent back to Pavuvu in the Russell Islands to recover. Bitter fighting in and around Umurbrogol continued for another month as the 81st Division troops struggled to expel the Japanese from the ridges and caves. On November 24, with American forces closing in, Nakagawa committed suicide. Three days later, the island was finally declared secure. Aftermath One of the costliest operations of the war in the Pacific, the Battle of Peleliu saw Allied forces sustain 2,336 killed and 8,450 wounded/missing. The 1,749 casualties sustained by Pullers 1st Marines nearly equaled the entire divisions losses for the earlier Battle of Guadalcanal. Japanese losses were 10,695 killed and 202 captured. Though a victory, the Battle of Peleliu was quickly overshadowed by the Allied landings on Leyte in the Philippines, which commenced on October 20, as well as the Allied triumph at the Battle of Leyte Gulf. The battle itself became a controversial topic as Allied forces took severe losses for an island that ultimately possessed little strategic value and was not used to support future operations. The new Japanese defensive approach was later used at Iwo Jima and Okinawa. In an interesting twist, a party of Japanese soldiers held out on Peleliu until 1947 when they had to be convinced by a Japanese admiral that the war was over.

Window XP outline

Window XP outline Windows XP Professional, the most recent client operating system release from Microsoft, has many advantages over its predecessors, making it the logical choice for implementation throughout Riordan Manufacturing.Built on Windows NT architecture* A true 32-bit operating system* Fully protected memory* Additional protection for the kernel and device drivers to prevent corruptionSystem Improvements* System Restore allows the system to be reverted back to a selectable date* Recovery Console allows administrators to perform advanced recovery tasks* User State Migration provides a convenient mechanism to move user setting to a new computer* Safe Mode options are available to troubleshoot startup problems* Application Compatibility enhancements allows XP to run hundreds of programs that Windows 2000 failed to operate* Automatic install and update latest security and software from Microsoft (with SP2)* Start and log on computer faster* Perform several task at one time without missing a beat Software Enhancements* Fewer reboots required when installing new software* Easier installation and program removal routines* Genuine multitasking architecture provides stable performance when running multiple applications* Safer Browsing with Internet Explorer.Internet Explorer 8 in Windows 7* Make browsing more enjoyable with dramatically fewer pop-up ads.* Provide better protection from potentially harmful downloads.* Assist you in finding and controlling Internet Explorer add-ons.* Stop scripts that resize or reposition windows without your permission.* Offer stronger security for your PC with built-in security enhancements.* Safer E-Mail Handling with Outlook Express* Screen unsafe e-mail attachments that could potentially spread viruses.* Block some images that might confirm your e-mail address to spammers.* Internet Explorer Add-on Manager prevents add-on applications from crashing the browser* Supports several multimedia environments including radio, streaming video, and con ferencing* New user interface allows easier access to...